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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 19-2617 
_____________ 
  
FANTA TOURE; SAMBA DIAKITE, 
                      Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;  
SECRETARY UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY;  
DIRECTOR UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES;  
CHAIRMAN BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS; DIRECTOR USCIS  
PHILADELPHIA FIELD OFFICE 
______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. No. 2-18-cv-01889) 
District Judge:  Hon. Michael M. Baylson 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a): 
March 26, 2020 
______________ 
 
Before:  JORDAN, RESTREPO, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: July 7, 2020) 
 
_____________ 
 
OPINION* 
______________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RESTREPO, Circuit Judge. 
Before us is the question of whether the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) properly denied Samba Diakite’s petition for a spousal visa on behalf 
of his wife, Fanta Toure, on grounds that he failed to establish that Toure was free to 
marry him. The District Court upheld the agency decision under the Administrative 
Procedures Act (APA). We will affirm the District Court decision. 
I 
Toure is a native and citizen of Mali.  She first entered the United States in 2000 
on a B-2 tourist visa. In the application for that visa, Toure listed her last name as “Toure 
epouse Kone,” JA987, 992, which means “Toure, spouse of Kone.” Her husband’s name 
was listed as “Cheick Oumar Tidiani Kone.” JA989, 991. Seven years later, she married 
Diakite, a U.S. citizen. 
In November 2007, Diakite began the process of applying for a spousal visa on 
behalf of Toure (Form I-130), so she could adjust her legal status (Form I-485). Over the 
course of several application attempts, Toure made a series of conflicting representations 
regarding her marital history and status.  
At one point during these spousal visa proceedings, USCIS placed Toure into 
separate removal proceedings based on “several willful misrepresentations of material 
fact” that she had allegedly made in connection with her visa applications. JA396. An 
immigration court stayed the removal proceedings pending the conclusion of the spousal 
visa proceedings.  
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After USCIS denied Diakite’s fourth application for a spousal visa, Diakite and 
Toure appealed that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). The BIA 
dismissed the appeal, noting inconsistencies in the record that failed to establish that 
Toure was free to marry.  
The couple appealed the BIA’s decision to the District Court, claiming that the 
agency decision was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA. The court 
disagreed and entered summary judgment for the government. Toure and Diakite now 
appeal the decision of the District Court.1 
II 
We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
actions brought under the APA and apply the same standard that the district court was 
required to apply to “the underlying agency decision.” Christ the King Manor, Inc. v. 
Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 730 F.3d 291, 305 (3d Cir. 2013) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  Under the APA, a court can set aside an agency decision if it 
is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” 
Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 389 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 706(2)(A)). 
We look to see if “the agency examined the relevant data and articulated a 
satisfactory explanation for its action, including a ‘rational connection between the facts 
found and the choice made.’” Id. at 389-90 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 5 U.S.C. § 704. We 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). “Courts are not permitted to re-weigh 
the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. 
Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 
(1971)). 
III 
“In order to establish eligibility for a spousal visa petition, the petitioner must 
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that any previous marriages of both the 
petitioner and the beneficiary have been legally terminated.” Matter of Kodwo, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 479, 479 (BIA 2008) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2)). 
Here, the BIA determined that Diakite failed to establish Toure’s eligibility for a 
spousal visa after the couple submitted “conflicting evidence, both in the form of the 
claims of the beneficiary [Toure] herself and the objective evidence of record, as to 
whether (and to whom) the beneficiary was previously married, and thus whether she was 
free to marry the petitioner [Diakite].” JA35.  
The record reveals that Toure made inconsistent representations regarding her 
marital status and history on various visa applications. On her application for a B-2 visa, 
she claimed to be married to a man named Cheick Oumar Tidiani Kone. When Diakite 
later applied for a spousal visa on her behalf, she asserted that she had not been 
previously married and admitted to having misrepresented her marital status on her B-2 
visa form. After USCIS notified the couple of its intent to deny the spousal visa petition, 
Toure changed course and claimed that she had been married to a man named Moussa 
Kone (not Cheick Oumar Tidiani Kone) who had passed away. At that point, USCIS 
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denied Diakite’s petition for the first time, setting off a series of three subsequent 
petitions in which Diakite and Toure attempted to set the record straight, to no avail. 
Eventually, Toure settled on the position that she had never been previously married. 
Regardless of which of these representations is true, they cannot all simultaneously be 
true, creating reasonable doubt as to her actual marital history and status. 
Furthermore, as the BIA noted, the objective evidence the couple submitted did 
not help to dispel this confusion, but rather “add[ed] to it.” JA35. For example, at one 
point, Toure produced a marriage certificate establishing her marriage to Moussa Kone, 
as well as his death certificate. These documents were purportedly issued by the District 
of Bamako, the capital of Mali. She later submitted a certificate of celibacy to support her 
claim that she had never been married, a document that was also supposedly issued by the 
District of Bamako. The contradictions between these documents raised legitimate 
concerns about the reliability of this evidence.  
In light of this record, the agency reasonably concluded that Diakite failed to 
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Toure was free to marry. See Quezada-
Caraballo v. Lynch, 841 F.3d 32, 33 (1st Cir. 2016) (upholding the BIA’s determination 
that, “in light of [the applicant’s] misrepresentations” and “the record as a whole,” she 
failed “to meet her burden to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that she had 
entered into a good-faith marriage”). 
The appellants claim that the agency decision is arbitrary and capricious because it 
conflicts with the position the government has taken in Toure’s removal proceedings. 
They argue that the government cannot rationally conclude that there was not enough 
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evidence to show that Toure was single, when she entered the United States, for purposes 
of denying her spousal visa, while at the same time taking the position that there is 
enough evidence to show that she was single and misrepresented that fact for purposes of 
seeking her removal. While these may sound like conflicting positions, on closer review, 
the government’s allegations in the removal proceedings do not necessarily contradict the 
agency decision. 
In removal proceedings, the government bears the initial burden of proving by 
clear and convincing evidence that a person is removable. 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a). A person 
is removable if she has obtained or sought to obtain a visa by fraud or willful 
misrepresentation of a material fact, among other grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A); 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(6)(C)(i).  
The government’s ability to make that showing is not contingent on the agency 
decision here. To be clear, USCIS has not decided whether Toure was or was not in fact 
single when she entered the United States or whether she mispresented that fact.  Rather, 
it only determined that Diakite failed to carry his burden of proving that it was more 
likely than not that Toure was free to marry him. As the government points out, Toure 
has made multiple representations that are potentially false, including that she was 
married to two different men (one of whom purportedly died) and that she was never 
married. The government could rely on any of these assertions (not only her 
representation that she was married when she entered the United States) to make its case 
for removal. Whether the immigration court’s ultimate determination in Toure’s removal 
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proceedings is reconcilable with the agency decision here and whether that matters are 
questions for another day.2 
IV 
For these reasons, we will affirm the District Court decision. 
 
2 The appellants also argue that we should apply a stricter form of scrutiny to an agency 
decision when there are “conflicts of interest which may have tainted the decision-
making process.” Appellants’ Br. 11 (citing Pinto v. Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 214 F.3d 
377, 379 (3d Cir. 2000)). We will not reach this issue, because the appellants did not 
present it to the District Court. See Lloyd v. Hovensa, 369 F.3d 263, 272-73 (3d Cir. 
2004). 
